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More than four years into the Great Recession of 2008, despite improved 
unemployment rates (though still at historic highs near 8 %) and the reelection of 
President Barack Obama, the recovery lags badly and the economy totters on the 
edge of collapsing anew. Painful austerity measures in Europe, contemplated 
Chinese economic retrenchment, and the possibility of either plunging over a 
seemingly ever-present “fiscal cliff” of drastic automatic budget cuts or locking into 
a debt-reduction deal that could stall even the weak recovery, threaten economic 
destimulations that could drag the world economy back into the vicious cycle of 
debt and dampened demand that could mean widespread and longlasting 
economic pain for people around the world.
INTRODUCTION
More than four years into the Great Recession of 2008, despite improved 
unemployment rates (though still at historic highs near 8 %) and the reelection of 
President Barack Obama, the recovery lags badly and the economy totters on the edge 
of collapsing anew.  Painful austerity measures in Europe, contemplated Chinese 
economic retrenchment, and the possibility of either plunging over a seemingly ever-
present “fiscal cliff” of drastic automatic budget cuts or locking into a debt-reduction deal 
that could stall even the weak recovery, threaten economic destimulations that could 
drag the world economy back into the vicious cycle of debt and dampened demand that 
1could mean widespread and longlasting economic pain for people around the world.
One study, cited by the Congressional Budget Office, estimated that the implementation of 
automatic across-the-board budget cuts slated for February, 2013, could cost the American economy 2.14 
million jobs and increase the unemployment rate by 1.5% (Blow, 2013).  
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Although the crisis is global, the United States is clearly its epicenter, and the 
failure of the US government to effectively respond to the crisis since 2008 hints at the 
underlying political foundations of an overtly economic crisis.  Many voters in the US 
blamed President Obama's policies, including some prominent critics to the left of the 
administration (Krugman, 2012), fueling a stronger-than-warranted challenge from a 
weak candidate leading an otherwise unappealing Republican Party.  The inability of the 
administration to lead vigorously in the face of intransigent Republican opposition, 
however, signals that the problem is deeper than misguided or timid policies, however.  
Centrist political scientists Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein (2012) have recently 
departed radically from the tradition of mainstream political science of justifying and 
rationalizing US political institutions; in warning readers that the crisis of US politics is 
actually “worst than it looks,” Ornstein and Mann defy the journalistic mania for “balance” 
by squarely blaming primarily the extremism of the Republican Party for the inability of 
Washington to resolve social and economic issues, but they also note that the 
combination of tightly ideological, almost European-style parliamentary parties and US 
political institutions designed to slow government action and check policy initiatives has 
led to a situation where the government is simply  unable to respond effectively to the 
issues of the day, including severe economic crisis.  US politics has arrived at an 
impasse without an exit.
Moreover, the world-wide and long-enduring nature of the crisis itself indicates 
that the Great Recession is more than the usual cyclical crises endemic to capitalism, 
but instead is a structural crisis rooted in our contemporary economic institutions.  The 
crisis of 2008 began as a bursting of the housing market bubble in the US, reflecting the 
huge household debt level that had been sustaining consumption since the 1980s when 
income levels for all but the top income categories began to stagnate.  When housing 
prices leveled off and variable rate mortgages kicked in, the debts came due and the 
mortgage market crashed.  Because deregulated financial institutions had aggressively 
bought up and liquidized mortgages in speculative investment vehicles, the housing 
crisis quickly morphed into a financial crisis, bringing some of the world's largest banking 
and investment houses into bankruptcy.  When government stepped in to bail out the 
banks, and the US auto industry, with massive transfusions of government cash, the 
costs, added to years of waging wars without paying for them and escalating entitlement 
programs matched with tax cuts, jolted public debt to new heights.  The efforts to cope 
with the crisis revealed the interlocking nature of the dilemmas faced.  Families tried to 
cope by lowering their indebtedness, but in the aggregate this merely undercut 
consumer demand.  State governments laid off thousands of public employees and cut 
expenditures, ironically offsetting almost exactly the stimulus plan passed early in the 
Obama administration.  In Washington, Republicans and Democrats agreed with the 
need for deficit reduction, but wrestled over the tax increases and spending cuts 
necessary for moving the budget toward balance, while most economists warned that 
prioritizing short-term deficit reduction risked inducing another deep recession by 
weakening demand in a still-struggling recovery.  
These dilemmas reveal the structural dimensions of the problem.  What is at 
stake is more than policies for recovery but a choice, and possibly a change, of our 
economic model, of  how we are to organize our productive activities.  To analogize the 
economy to a car (an appropriate metaphor since cars are the motors of contemporary 
economies), we face not simply a question of who is going to drive the car and how fast, 
but rather what type of car will we drive (a Cadillac or a Ford, or more likely a Toyota) and 
where we are going to go.
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1.        REGULATION THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURES OF ACCUMULATION
Thus, underlying the economic crisis is a deeper series of problems that should 
be considered, and labeled, political for three reasons.  First, the economic crisis of 2008 
was caused in large part by the failed Bush administration policies, having their roots in 
the right turn in American politics led by Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, but the inability of 
the Obama administration to cure the crisis US signals the profound failure of US 
political institutions.  Second, to resolve the crisis will require the reconstruction of more 
adequate institutions, both political and economic, which in turn will require intense 
political struggles.  And third, the choices raised in reforming our institutions call into 
question the currently dominant model of democracy and put the search for a deeper 
understanding of democratic practices squarely on the political agenda.  
The current economic crisis, and its intimate connections with social and political 
institutions, is illuminated by regulation theory,  school of economic analysis originating 
2in France but with related American variants.  The fundamental approach of the 
regulation theorists fits the current economic and political conjuncture well: unlike 
orthodox capitalist economists, who emphasize the tendency of market economies to 
equilibrium and the long-term trend of stability of capitalism - a position obviously refuted 
by the events of 2008, although remarkably difficult to lay to rest (Quiggin, 2010) - 
regulation theory recognizes the conflictual and crisis tendencies in capitalism.  
Departing from orthodox Marxist theories, however, regulation theory does not foresee 
the ultimate collapse of capitalism in every periodic crisis (Tickell and Peck, 1992).  
Rather, regulation theorists describe a capitalism that passes through long waves of 
economic cycles, lasting roughly a generation of forty to fifty years, with periods of 
prosperity alternating with epochs of crisis, each lasting roughly half of the underlying 
cycle, or of approximately twenty-five years.  In this view, periods of crisis do not signify 
the final collapse of capitalism but rather basic structural failures that evoke radical 
reforms that are necessary for the restoration of successful functioning of capitalism, 
similar to the way periodic forest fires, far from destroying the forest, are necessary for its 
ongoing health.  The reformed capitalism that emerges from crises periods, however, is 
not the same as the pre-crisis capitalist system, reflecting as it does the significant 
modifications necessary to sustain the economy and induce another period of prosperity 
(McDonough, 2008).  Thus the economy of the New Deal was not the same capitalism of 
the 1920s anymore than today's economy is the same capitalism that dominated after 
WWII.
Regulation theories do not have a consensus on the causes or rhythms of long 
waves, nor do they agree on what the current configuration of capitalism consists of or 
where we stand in terms of periodization of waves.  For example, is the current 
prolonged crisis a symptom that the post-Fordist regime of accumulation is taking an 
unusually long time to establish itself and realize the normal period of prosperity, or does 
Some of the more prominent French theorists are Miguel Aglietta, Alan Lipeitz, Robert Boyer, with 
Bob Jessop serving as both a theorist in his own right and the most prominent purveyor of regulation 
theory in English.  American economists, mostly associated with the University of Massachusetts at 
Amherst,  such as Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis, David Gordon, Richard Edwards did pioneering and 
somewhat parallel work, built upon by David Kotz, Michael Reich, David Neilson, and other economists 
publishing much of their work in the Review of Radical Political Economics.
2         
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the current crisis represent the dissolution of post-Fordism, expressed in its political 
variant as neoliberalism, indicating that we are about to enter a new epoch of 
experimentation and exploration in search of neoliberalism's replacement regime.  This 
question itself rests on the view of modes or regulation or social structures of 
accumulation (defined below): do regimes of accumulation always enjoy a period of 
profit and growth before breaking down, in which case post-Fordism would still seem to 
be in the installation phase?  or alternatively, instead of social structures of accumulation 
working, almost it seems by definition, by virtue of their function, during the initial 
establishment of new regimes, do they sometimes function only rather ineffectively, in 
which case post-Fordism, despite never having enjoyed a “golden era” like Fordism after 
WWII, might already be entering its breakdown phase (Neilson, 2012; O'Hara, 2003; 
Kotz, 1990).
The problems of internal differences within regulation theory is exacerbated by 
inconsistent use of terminology in describing and defining concepts.  The most basic 
concept is captured by the term regime of accumulation, but French theorists Lipeitz and 
Aglietta mean slightly different things by this term.  Both use the term to focus on the 
economic, productive activities of a society, but Lipeitz limits the term to cover strictly 
economic phenomenon, while Aglietta uses it in a broader sense to include the mode of 
regulation (Kotz, 1990).  Regulation theorists' main contribution is exactly the focus on 
the mode of regulation, the social and political and even cultural institutions necessary to 
assure the functioning of the regime of accumulation so that economic processes can 
work to produce profits and economic growth.  According to regulation theory, capitalist 
productive processes are fraught with problems, rather than functioning smoothly as a 
“natural" system as orthodox capitalist economists often claim.  The various sources of 
economic contradictions and tensions vary by author, with the French regulationists, like 
Marx, emphasizing the class conflict inherent in capitalism, while the American 
economists, more in a Keynesian vein, stress the disjunctions between savings and 
investments that can induce a much less vigorous economy in practice as opposed to 
the market-clearing equilibrium posited by orthodox capitalist theorists (McDonough, 
Kotz, and Reich, 2010).  The main contribution of the American economists to this theory 
has been to specify and describe more concretely the functioning of the mode of 
regulation, or in their terms, social structures of accumulation.  Such structures include, 
for example, credit, education and training, property rights, fiscal and monetary policies, 
labor and employment law, the law of contracts, and even the cultural phenomena such 
as the mass media and religion.    
Aside from the fundamental point shared by these theorists that economic 
activity requires socio-political direction and regulation to succeed, the great hypothesis 
of the school is to assert that disjunctions between regimes of accumulation and modes 
of regulations/social structures of accumulations are the principal source of dynamism in 
capitalist development (Ruccio, 1989).  When social structures of accumulation function 
effectively, the regime of accumulation will also function well, producing profits of 
capitalists and economic growth for society.  These periods of prosperity, however, have 
limited durations and are destined to give way to crises, when the institutions of social 
accumulation no long fit comfortably with the economic activities of that particular model 
of capitalism.  This disjunction can occur for any number of concrete historical reasons, 
but for one reason or another, social structures of accumulation have an inevitable 
tendency to become inadequate to resolve the conflicts and contradictions of capitalist 
regimes of production.  More work is needed by regulation theorists to explain the 
regular failure of modes of regulation - some sort of middle level theory of the life cycle of 
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institutions that would bridge the gap between sweeping generalizations about the 
inevitable collapse of social structures of accumulation and very specific theories of the 
collapse of specific is needed.  At a very general level, however, there is a sense that 
social structures of accumulation that were effective at resolving the problems that 
initially plagued  new regimes of accumulation and helped inaugurate waves of 
prosperity are turned toward resolving past problems and cannot successfully handle 
the new challenges that inevitably (given the theorized contradictory nature of capitalist 
production.  The regime of accumulation enters into a crisis at this point, necessitating 
experimentation and exploration for new economic processes and corresponding new 
socio-political institutions capable of sustaining a new regime of accumulation, so that 
the crisis can be overcome and production and prosperity can be restored. Construction 
of new social structures of accumulation, however, normally takes substantial 
experimentation and time and generally is accomplished only with prolonged and 
intense social conflict, as groups seek advantages and protections in the configuration 
of social modes of regulation (Gordon, Edwards, Reich, 1982).
Given this overarching hypothesis of capitalist development as waves of 
prosperity alternating with periods of breakdown, the pattern of capitalist development is 
hypothesized to be somewhat regular.  First a period of relatively stability and prosperity 
reigns, normally for almost twenty-five years.  Then, either failures within these social 
structures of accumulation or a mismatch between these social structures of 
accumulation and the regime's economic processes means that the contemporary 
social structures of accumulation are inadequate to regulate and support the continuing 
smooth functioning of that regime of accumulation, ushering in a period of 
experimentation, struggle, and eventual reconstruction of new social structures of 
accumulations and perhaps remodeled processes of production - resulting in a new 
regime of accumulation.  Thus capitalist development is neither an a historical utopia of 
equilibrium and stability, as posited by orthodox economists, nor a system rushing 
rapidly downhill to inevitable final collapse, as eternally “optimistic pessimists” in the 
3Marxist camp allege, but rather a somewhat cyclical  succession of regimes of 
accumulation, all capitalist with shared basic characteristics such as private ownership 
of the means of production, production for profit, and labor based on waged 
employment, but varying substantially within this fundamental framework as to how the 
4capitalist production processes actually take place.    
Edwards, Gordon, and Reich (1982), in the premier work on social structures of 
accumulation, describe the development of the U.S. economy using a regulationist 
approach.  In their sketch of American economic history, capitalism took root in the U.S. 
in the 1820s, establishing a regime of small-scale, individual capitalism that lasted until 
about the 1870s.  This was a regime of accumulation based on direct, individual 
ownership (largely agricultural and small crafts), intense market competition, and 
This leads to a criticism of regulation theory that it is almost deterministically cyclical in its view of 
history.  This criticism seems particularly valid as long as a theory of institutional life cycles is lacking.  
Presumably, to the extent they are still influenced by Marx, regulation theorists would posit a long-
term tendency to collapse of capitalism, that the series of solutions provided by successive social 
structures of accumulation are simply temporary “fixes” that do not succeed in eliminating the 
contradictions that eventually doom the capitalist mode of production.  The focus, and contribution, of 
regulation theory, however, is not on the ultimate destination of capitalist development, but rather the 
series of reforms and restructurings that produce historical variation among types of regimes of 
accumulation, all within the mode of capitalist production.
3         
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laissez-faire government policies.  By the 1880s, this model of capitalism had entered 
into crisis, challenged by the emerging forms of corporate large-scale property and 
production and their tendency to monopolistic control over productions (trusts), 
combined with political corruption and favoritism.  This regime of corporate capitalism 
eventually met its demise with the Great Depression, to be replaced by a more 
egalitarian welfare-state regulated by an active state pursuing domestic policies to 
stimulate demand and smooth over the business cycle (a la Keynesian theory) and aid 
those unable to thrive in the marketplace.  This model was supported by huge 
corporations, who dominated national markets as oligopolies, largely freed from intense 
competition and able to sustain both decent wages for their workers and pay the high 
taxes necessary to fund the welfare state.  This post-Depression model, however, met 
its match with the stagnation of the 1970s, faltering for various reasons and giving way to 
the neoliberalism of recent times - a model rooted in multinational corporations 
operating and competing in a globalized economy and mandating a reduced role for 
states both in terms of regulating corporate behavior and supporting populations with 
domestic welfare policies.  A closer look at the last two regimes of accumulation reveals 
much about the current crisis.
2.        FORDISM
The Great Depression spelled the end for unregulated or Gilded Age corporate 
capitalism, as the New Deal put into place a system of state-regulated capitalism that 
came to full fruition only after the experience of state-corporate cooperation in the war 
effort against Fascism (Mills, 1956).  Fordism was a system of mass production of 
industrial products, using automated production technology (epitomized by Henry 
Ford's assembly line) to manufacture standardized products in massive quantities.  
Cars were the product that epitomized this capitalist model, and the classic story of 
Henry Ford's Model T, a cheap standardized car manufactured for the mass 
consumption model that made autos a middle class machine, captures the essence of 
Fordist production in mass: Henry Ford is supposed to have quipped that customers 
could buy any color of Model T their hearts desired . . . as long as it was black.
The production of great quantities of affordable products, however, 
required a mass market of consumers who could, in fact, afford to purchase the large 
supply of products produced.  Lacking this, Fordist production would have ground to a 
screeching halt (as it had, in effect, during the Great Depression) for lack of demand, lack 
of a market of consumers to buy the fantastic output of large-scale production.  
Consumption in mass presupposed a population with reasonable levels of income and 
this strong consumption was supported through several interlocking and compatible 
private practices and government policies.  First, government used monetary and fiscal 
policy to boost demand and sustain prosperity.  Second, domestic welfare policies 
helped ensure that enough people had sufficient income to keep private demand high.  
Finally, with government support, unions won grudging acceptance by large 
corporations who realized that paying workers enough to buy their products was good 
business.  About one-third of the workforce was unionized, and their influence on pay 
and benefits spilled over into non-unionized areas of the economy and their political 
support was an important pillar of Keynesian welfare policies.
The result is still celebrated as the “golden years” of the American 
economy, or what Robert Reich (2007)calls “democratic capitalism.”  In retrospect, the 
period from WWII until the mid-1970s was supported by various implicit social pacts, in 
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effect creating a network of social structures of accumulation, that supported this era of 
prosperity.  Bowles and Gintis (1982) specify three key pacts.
1) a pact between labor and capital, the so-called “Treaty of Detroit” (so 
named after the city that produced the bulk of the prototypical product of 
the era, automobiles).  The auto industry, like other heavy industries in 
the US during the 1930s, had been the scene of bloody battles as 
workers sought to unionize, but after WWII, auto corporations 
recognized unions and granted significantly high levels of salaries and 
benefits in return for a union concession to leave questions of the 
organization of production to corporate management.  
2) a pact between capital and citizens, resulting in the establishment of a 
welfare state.  Although the U.S. version was a pale reflection of the 
stronger European welfare state, relying much more heavily on private 
provision of benefits (e.g., private pensions, health insurance, 
5unemployment assistance, etc. ), the government undertook the task of 
assuring prosperity by managing the economy through Keynesian fiscal 
and monetary policies as well as supporting aggregate demand by 
aiding the worst-off citizens who received insufficient income through 
the private labor market.
3) “Pax Americana,” which, far from being an era of peace, involved the 
U.S. in constant warfare of the preparation for war, both hot and cold.  
The resulting astronomical expenditures on armaments constituted a 
version of “military Keynesianism” that provided both public stimulation 
and investments to keep the economy growing.  
Cf. Jacob Hacker (2011), who argues that the U.S. welfare state is actually more robust than 
usually recognized because many benefits are relatively less visible because privately provided.  This 
private welfare state is itself a measure of the strength of American unions, their legacy of “voluntarism,” 
and their success in winning member benefits through the capital-labor accord,  Seen from another angle, 
however, this truncated public aspect of the American welfare state reflects the strength of capitalist 
ideology and weakness of labor and the left (Archer, 2010).  For the largely unnoticed but decisive role 
played by the South in manacling the development of a full-blown European-style welfare state, see 
Cochran (2001). 
5         
The so-called Golden Era was not equally beneficial for all portions of the 
population.  The unorganized, especially ethnic minorities, women, and the poor, were 
largely excluded from the primary economy; they were either unemployed or employed 
in the secondary economy consisting of non-unionized jobs with worse working 
conditions, lacking in benefits, and earning less pay, as well as offering less stability and 
opportunity for advancement.   And much of the so-called Third World, rather than 
benefited, was exploited at best and the scene of great power intrigue and proxy wars at 
worst.  Even excluded groups, however, to some extent benefited indirectly from the 
patterns established by the primary economy in the core countries, and for those core 
workers, the benefits represented a stark contrast from the epoch of depression.  From 
WWII until the mid-1970s, the average worker's family income doubled, and most core 
workers also enjoyed stable lifetime employment with the same company and a career 
premised on an implicit contract offering an internal career ladder presenting 
opportunities for advancement.  However stifled in individuality, the “Organization Man” 
(Whyte, 1959) enjoyed hitherto unheard of security and prosperity.  
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Fordism, however, encountered severe difficulties beginning in the 1960s, and by 
the mid-1970s had entered into a prolonged crisis.  Many factors contributed to the 
demise of Fordism, but several stand out.  Most frequently cited was the return of 
international competition.  Far from being new, globalization represented a return to 
capitalist internationalism that the Depression and two world wars had temporarily 
interrupted.  For U.S. corporations, renewed competition, especially from the defeated 
states of Germany and Japan, meant an end to the comfortable national oligopolies they 
had enjoyed, making it difficult to pass on the costs of high wages and high taxes to 
consumers, who could now buy cheaper foreign products, and exerting pressure to 
break with the pacts with unions and citizens to support higher incomes and expansive 
government policies.  From the perspective of public finance, this squeeze on corporate 
profits generated a “fiscal crisis of the state,” (O'Connor, 1982) as ever more active and 
expensive policies were necessary to support Fordist production, but states found it 
increasingly difficult to finance these programs as corporations and taxpayers generally 
rebelled against higher taxes.  The result was stagflation, simultaneous unemployment 
and inflation, which Keynesian policies seemed unable to cope with successfully.  The 
1960s also saw growing agitation from groups excluded from the Fordist pacts, as 
minorities, the poor, and women pressed for entry into primary employment and equal 
wages.  The Third World witnessed numerous wars of national liberation which limited 
multinational options for exploiting their labor and raw materials, and the budding 
environmental movement brought to light just how squarely mass industrialism rested 
on the unlimited exploitation of finite nature.  All of these developments - international 
competition, the fiscal crisis of the state, and emerging social movements - reduced 
corporate profits, the motor of capitalist growth, causing both a crisis in Fordism and 
setting off a search for a new model of capitalism.
3.        TOYOTISM
The restructuring of the economy lacks the clear outlines of Fordism, as reflected 
in the label of “post-Fordism” often given to the search for an alternative economic model 
in the latter quarter of the twentieth century (with competing labels of neo-Fordism and 
Toyotism). If the watchword of Fordism had been stability, the slogan of attempts to 
reinvigorate the economy was “flexibility”. The economic center of gravity shifted from 
manufacturing to services and retail, and production was transfigured from mass to 
batch production. Corporate organization itself was reconfigured to gain more flexibility, 
as corporations “deverticalized” by sloughing off divisions and outsourcing functions as 
well as “flattening” the managerial hierarchy, often by “democratizing” work by devolving 
more decision-making responsibilities further down the chain of command. The label 
Toyotism reflected the increasing popularity of Japanese style management techniques, 
including just-in-time and lean production techniques and participatory management, 
e.g., quality circles.  Employment itself became more flexibilized, with increased 
reliance on outsourcing and more contingent forms of employment.  Lifetime careers 
were replaced by free agents who expected to, and did, switch employers and even 
careers many times in the course of a lifetime of employment.
The differences between fading Fordism and the emerging outlines of 
Toyotism are starkly contrasted by comparing the prototypical Fordist corporation, 
General Motors, with the template (Lcihtenstein) for Toyotism, Wal-Mart:
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                                        General Motors                   Wal-Mart
Activity                              Manufacturing                        Retail
Product                                   Cars                                Market
Consumer items                   National                             Global
Competition                         Oligopoly                            Intense
Social policy                corporate citizenship           rejects corporate 
Social responsibility
Headquarters              Detroit, Mich (rustbelt)      Benton, Ark (sunbelt)
Corporate culture           Yankee capitalism         Cowboy 
capitalism 
Employment                       Unionized                     Non-unionized
Ave. salary                       $64,000/year                   $17,500/year
CEO/Ave. employee              40:1                                 900:1
The last three characteristics are especially revealing; with the diminished 
employee power of a non-unionized workforce, Wal-Mart workers earn far less than their 
Fordist GM counterparts did.  Instead, comparing CEO to average worker salaries, the 
“flexibilization” of Toyotism can be seen as resulting in not merely a restructuring of 
production but also a massive redistribution of wealth from the bottom up.
4.        NEOLIBERALISM
The policies and politics that have accompanied, and to some extent produced, 
Toyotism are often labeled neoliberalism.  David Kotz (2009) provides a useful summary 
of the elements of the neoliberal governance that replaced the liberalism of the welfare 
state epoch:
1) deregulation of business and the financial sector;
2) privatization of formerly state-provided services (including even 
aspects of the armed forces);
3) displacement of prosperity as the priority of economic policy in favor 
of debt reduction and prevention;
4) dramatic reduction of welfare-state expenditures (including popular 
entitlement programs);
5) tax relief for companies and upper-income taxpayers;
6) weakening of unions;
7) increased use of contingent forms of employment;
8) strong competition;
9) adoption of market rules to internal corporate decisions and practices, 
for example, in paying CEOs high, competitive salaries.  
One might add to the list exorbitantly high (especially in light of the end of the Cold 
War) expenditures on arms and policies of repression, both global and domestic (for 
example, the war on drugs and the unconscionably high rate of incarceration in the 
U.S.).
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David Harvey, in his Brief History of Neoliberalism (2005) argues that these 
neoliberal policies did not aim so much at reviving economic growth as they constituted a 
political project of the capitalist class with the object of restoring class power and thus 
enabling higher profits. He views neoliberalism's program as nothing less than a 
counter-offensive by business against the gains of working classes worldwide during the 
Fordist era. Beginning with the famous memo by Lewis Powell to the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, Harvey details the steps taken to establish neoliberalism as the reigning 
idea of the late twentieth century.  Tactics such as establishing conservative think tanks, 
endowing named chairs in universities (e.g., chairs of free enterprise) and law schools 
6(law and economics),  research funds and scholarships, public relations and lobbying,  
8and influence in the media.  The results bear out Harvey's claim. Economically, 
neoliberalism's track record is unimpressive.  In Latin America, for example, the turn 
toward neoliberalism in the 1980s produced a “lost decade.” In the U.S., productivity 
stagnated and average wages grew very little, mostly during the less purely neoliberal 
Clinton administration.  As a political project to restore capitalist power and income, 
however, the results were nothing less than spectacular.  Neoliberal governments under 
leaders such as Thatcher, Reagan, and Bush enjoyed electoral good fortune after 
decades of marginalization after the collapse of the Gilded Age in the Great Depression, 
and capitalist income and wealth soared, not because of general economic growth but 
rather because of the extreme inequality that resulted from neoliberal practices and 
policies.  While the income of the poorest quintile increased only 6% from 1979 to 2005, 
and the middle quintile's income grew by 21%, the income of the wealthiest 1% grew by 
230%.  Even among the wealthy, the richest of the rich did noticeably better than the rest; 
the average after-tax household income of the richest one-hundredth of one percent 
increased from $4 million to $24.3 million, a sixfold growth rate (Hacker and Pierson, 
2010, p. 157).  In fact, since 1980 the richest 1% have captured 80% of the increased 
income from economic growth under neoliberalism.  By 2007, the portion of income 
received by the richest 1%, which had fallen to 9% in 1970 during the welfare-state era, 
had again reached the level that they gained in 1929: 24% .  And while the crisis of 2008 
hurt the rich along with everyone else, they recovered much more agilely: the richest 1% 
received a startling 93% of the income generated by the recovery in 2009-10 (Noah, 
2012).  That the wealthiest prospered so shockingly while the recovery for most 
Americans languished agonizingly even under a Democratic administration and 
Congress graphically illustrates what Hacker and Pierson (2010, 2011) assert - that the 
redistribution of income up the socio-economic scale was not a matter of partisan 
politics, but rather a class victory for the capitalist elite.  As billionaire investor Warren 
Buffett (2006) recently noted ironically, “There's class warfare, all right, but it's my class, 
7
Steven Tellis (2008) has analyzed the strategy of the conservative legal movement to rescue what 
they style the “Constitution in exile,” in essence, the pre-New Deal understanding of constitutional 
limitations on the federal government.
Hacker and Jacob (2010, 176) particularly emphasize this aspect of the business counter-attack, 
noting that only 175 businesses  had corporate lobbyists in Washington in 1971 compared to 2,445 in 
1982.  Corporate public affairs offices in DC increased from 100 to 500 in the decade from 1968 to 1978, 
while the number of Political Action Committees for funneling corporate campaign contributions to 
politicians quadrupled from under 300 to 1,200 in the late 1970s.
Not content to intimidate the media with a savage campaign against “liberal media bias,” 
conservative Rupert Murdoch established Fox News.  Although often treated as just another news 
channel or conservative counterbalance to the liberal channels, Fox actually functioned as the 
propaganda arm of the conservative movement (McChesney, 2004). 
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the rich class, that's making war, and we're winning.” 
As regulation theory would predict, however, the neoliberal solutions to 
the problems of diminished profits under stagnating Fordism have themselves been 
fraught with problems.  As Kotz (2009) notes, deregulation led to speculations and 
economic bubbles, as first technology and then housing first became vastly overpriced, 
eventuating in the bubbles bursting and leading to the minor recession of the early 2000s 
and then the Great Recession of 2008. Many if not all of the neoliberal policies such as 
reduced welfare spending and lowered taxes on the well-off, privatization and 
deregulation, the weakening of unions and contingent employment, led to dizzyingly 
high levels of inequality not seen since the Gilded Era before the Great Depression, 
which in turned undermined the economy.  Because the rich save and potentially invest 
a higher portion of their income while ordinary citizens need to spend their income on 
necessities, the neoliberal economy is imbalanced and lacks sufficient demand for 
sustained growth (Noah 2012).  The obsession with lowering taxes and reducing deficit 
offered by neoliberals as the fix-all formula for all economic woes is, ironically, a recipe 
for economic disaster, as noted by many prominent economists including Nobel-winning 
9economists Paul Krugman (2012) and Joseph Stiglitz (2012).
The enduring power of neoliberal hegemony, however, could be seen even after President 
Obama's re-election as Republicans held tenaciously to their rigid ideological formulas and discussion in 
the media continued to prioritize deficit reduction.  This outmoded neoliberal framing of economic policies 
remained strong even in the face of increasing mainstream professional wisdom that stimulation, not 
deficit reduction, should top the economic agenda.  See the letter of 350 economists to President Obama 
urging him to resist calls for budget balancing in the face of lagging recovery (“CEOs Wrong,” 2012).
9         
5.        THE POLITICAL CRISIS
If neoliberalism led Toyotism off an economic cliff, it has had even worse effects 
politically because, as most political theorists including the supposedly conservative 
American Founders have understood, severe economic and social inequality is 
incompatible with a healthy democracy.  Today's levels of extreme inequality threaten to 
undermine democracy in three fundamental ways: 
1) Oligarchy: The huge redistribution of wealth upward in the economic 
scale created a class of elites that fit the profile of an oligarchy, the few 
who have giant concentrations of political power to rule 
disproportionately in their own interest.  Winters (2011) has argued that 
democracies are not automatically incompatible with oligarchies, at 
least in some policy arenas, and they maintain that this concept of rule 
by the few wealth and powerful members of society fits the current 
situation in the United States.  They further suggest that “wealth 
protecting strategies” define the essence of oligarchies' political goals.  
Policy shifts generated by the neoliberal term certainly fit that 
description, especially as the 2012 election witnessed, with Citizens 
United's (2010)  removal of legal restraints on campaign finance by 
corporations, the flooding of campaigns with cash provided by 
billionaires.
2)  Dependency: Democracy is premised on the independent will and 
judgment of its citizens, but political independency can be undermined 
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by economic dependency, which worsens in situations of great 
inequality.  As Rousseau (1987) put it, no one should be so rich as to be 
able to purchase other citizens, nor should any citizens be so poor as to 
have to sell themselves.  With economic power in the hands of a few, the 
citizenry, as individuals and as a nation, become captive to the 
economic will of the few and dependent on their beneficence.  The direct 
suggestions of some corporate CEOs as to how their employees should 
vote in 2012 was merely an explicit manifestation of the underlying 
problem of economic dependence, which enables the wealthy to avoid 
democratic persuasion and rely instead on economic coercion of those 
dependent on their economic grace.
3) Citizenship: At the other end of the spectrum from oligarchy, great 
disparities can undermine democratic citizenship by eroding the sense 
of efficacy of the majority.  Lacking any sense of being in charge of their 
10own destiny, citizens are less likely to participate,  more likely to be 
fatalistic, and even to bend their will to what they perceive as the will, and 
inevitable result, of the powerful. If, as Lord Acton teaches, power 
corrupts, just as surely does powerlessness corrupt (Gaventa 1982).  
Thus we come full circle - if politics undermines our ability to respond to economic 
crisis, and if political choices, and struggles, underlie our ability (or lack of it) to resolve 
the crisis by building new economic models, it turns out that what is ultimately at stake is 
nothing less that the future of democracy itself.  In the last half century we have moved 
from what Reich (2007) calls “democratic capitalism” (Fordism) to what he calls 
“supercapitalism,” which, tellingly, omits any reference to democracy.  If neoliberalism 
has produced the greatest recession since the 1930s, it has also spawned the sharpest 
challenge to democracy since that epoch of totalitarianism.  The analysis of the 
economic crisis of 2008 reveals that the real crisis behind the crisis is that democracy is 
withering and unless the crisis elicits an explicitly pro-democratic movement in 
response, the end of democracy with any real substance may be near.  Of course the 
forms and labels of democracy will likely linger to legitimate whatever twisted political 
forms remain.  Sheldon Wolin (2008) has recently analyzed “Democracy, Inc.” as a form 
of “inverted totalitarianism,” following in the footsteps of Bertram Gross (1980), who at 
the dawn of neoliberalism warned of the danger that authoritarianism.  Gross argued, 
however, that authoritarian replacements for liberal democracy in the United States 
would likely appear not in overt measures of explicit dictatorship, but rather in subtle 
forms of “friendly fascism.”  Indeed, we risk seeing the plaintive complaint of Fran 
Leibowitz turn out to be accurate: “In the Soviet Union, capitalism triumphed over 
Communism.  In the United States, capitalism triumphed over democracy.” 
Pateman (1970) contends that a sense of efficacy is the key to political participation, and builds 
her argument for participatory democracy largely on its ability to instill efficacy among participants, thus 
becoming self-sustaining.
10         
6.        THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE
The end of this history, however, has yet to be written.  If regulation theory is 
applicable to our current situation, it is possible that we are in the midst of a period of 
crisis and experimentation to reconstruct the mode of regulation that will allow the 
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economy to function smoothly and grow in the next epoch.  There is nothing of the nature 
of an iron law of nature about these cycles or the sequence of economic models that 
result.  The construction of social structures of accumulation is a matter of human 
ingenuity, and of political struggle.
Interestingly, theories of partisan political cycles seem to concur that we 
are in a period of potentially significant political creativity.  Some political scientists have 
used a theory of periodic realignments to describe and explain significant and enduring 
shifts in the development of electoral politics in the U.S.  Though often controverted and 
criticized, this theory of realignment offers an intriguingly regular and revealing 
periodization of American partisan history, arguing that critical elections occur every 
generation (roughly every 36 to 40 years) that decisively alter the partisan landscape for 
11a generation to come.   The theory posits that in some epochs elections raise issues of 
such weight and novelty, usually in response to some social crisis such as war or 
depression, that old partisan solutions no longer provide satisfactory answers, leading 
voters to detach from their old partisan loyalties in favor of new political identities, or 
alternatively, a new generation forms partisan identities in modes distinctly different from 
the previous generation.  The result is a dramatic shift in the underlying distribution of 
partisan identification, the factor thought most influential in determining voting, such that 
the previous balance of forces between majority and minority parties is upset, not just for 
an exceptional, or deviating election, but for the next generation of elections.  Thus the 
old pattern of election results is displaced by a “new normal” alignment between the 
parties, often accompanied by policy, organizational, state, and campaign innovations 
as well. 
Realignment theorists differ on the details (especially the dates when they 
discern realigning elections as having occurred, especially in the most recent years), but 
a typical schematic history of realigning elections and periods would be:
V. O. Key, Jr., is credited with originating the theory of alignment in two articles in the Journal 
of Politics (1955, 1959).  Walter Dean Burnham (1970) has provided the classic explication of the 
concept as a tool for understanding the American political development. For a thorough critique of the 
very concept of realignment as well as of its application to American political history, see David 
Mayhew (2002).
11         
1800 - 1828: the demise of the Federalists and emergence of the 
Democratic Republicans led by Jefferson;
1828 - 1860: a period of close competition in which Whigs and smaller 
parties contested with Democratic Republicans, alternating in power;
1860 - 1896: the appearance of the Republicans, whose dominance is 
assured by the North's victory in the Civil War, and the creation of 
regional-based parties (with the south becoming solidly Democratic);
1896 - 1932: Republican dominance continues as regional parties are 
consolidated, but within the majority Republicans, surging 
industrialization unites captains of industry and urban, ethnic workers 
against rural, agricultural forces;
1932 - 1968: the Great Depression ends 70 years of Republican 
dominance as voters blame the party of Hoover for the Depression and 
endorse Franklin Roosevelt and his active state embodied in New Deal 
policies and institutions for a generation of liberal welfare state politics;
 Revista de Direitos Fundamentais e Democracia, Curitiba, v. 14, n. 14, p. 2-20, julho/dezembro de 2013.
THE CRISIS BEHIND THE CRISIS: IN SEARCH OF NEW MODEL OF DEMOCRACY
15
1968 - ?: the demise of the New Deal electoral system as well as policies 
lacks decisive definition, but by the end of the 1960s splits within the 
Democratic coalition, especially the desertion of Southern Whites and 
northern ethnic working class voters, and the displacement of economic 
issues by social and culture issues, ushers in an era where Republicans 
seem to enjoy a slight political edge.  Alternatively, some political 
scientists characterize recent American political history as an epoch of 
dealignment, not realignment, arguing that the partisan loyalties and 
party organizations that structured previous electoral politics have 
weakened, resulting in a fluid politics where parties are not only closely 
competitive but also where results are highly variable and turn on 
12relatively trivial matters rather than great questions of state policy.
Even conceding validity to the theory of realignment, it is unclear whether the 
U.S. is in a realigning era, although the historical pattern suggests that the country is due 
for one (since in the past realigning elections have occurred at intervals of 36-40 years, 
or roughly a political generation).  Some analysts saw signs that President Obama's 
election in 2008 represented a realignment; for example, Morely Winograd and Michael 
Hais (2008) believed that the attitudes of the Millennial Generation, defined as those 
born between 1982 and 2003, were so distinct and their methods of social interaction 
(e.g., by using social media) so innovative that they represented a realigning force in 
American politics.  And indeed, Obama's mobilization of the youth vote and the strong 
tendency for young voters to vote for Obama and identify with the Democrats, as well as 
his campaigns innovative use of social media to reach young voters, gave some support 
to the idea that 2008 could represent a sea change in American politics and not merely 
another alteration in office so typical of the 1968-2008 era.  The failure to solve the 
economic crisis of 2008  and promote swift recovery, however, resulted not in a landslide 
endorsement of the Obama administration (as had occurred in FDR's second election in 
1936, for instance) but rather a lackluster near tie based on lower voter turnout, including 
among youths, than in 2008.  On the other hand, some political scientists have noted 
that the real shift in long-term loyalties probably does not occur during the election 
season itself but reflects reactions to what administrations do in office.  Key himself, after 
proposing a theory of “critical elections,” (1955) modified his theory of realignment to 
include a notion of “secular realignments,” (1959) fundamental changes that take a 
number of years and a series of elections to take hold.  It could be argued that it was only 
after the mobilization of a strike wave in 1934, the stubborn declaration of initial Hundred 
Days New Deal legislation by the “Nine Old Men” of the conservative Supreme Court, 
and the second burst of more radical New Deal reforms (Social Security Act, National 
Labor Relations Act) in 1935 that Roosevelt managed to consolidate his 1932 victory 
and gain the loyalty of a generation of voters for his future re-elections and those of his 
Democratic heirs.  In light of this analysis, it might be more accurate to suggest not that 
the U.S. is necessarily in the midst of a realignment or even clearly in a realigning period, 
but rather that the time is ripe for a realignment whose realization will depend on the 
actions of not only political leaders but also the potential mobilization of ordinary citizens 
to press elites for leadership in resolving contemporary problems.
For example, W. Lance Bennett(1992) has argued that we now have a 3M electoral system 
based on money, marketing, and media.  Others have sought to reconcile the concepts of realignment 
and dealignment in various ways, for example, arguing that U.S. politics have realigned in to a new 
party system lacking the clear partisan divisions typical in much of American history, in other words, a 
realignment into a dealigned party system. 
12         
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7.        MODELS OF DEMOCRACY
If we are in a fluid period of potential political realignment, and if what is ultimately 
at stake is democracy itself, what models of democracy are available to guide the choice 
of future governing structures?  Neither major political party is explicitly proposing 
models of democracy, nor are general conceptions of democracy being consciously 
considered in discussions in the public arena.  Nonetheless, it is possible to discern 
divergent views on the subject by abstracting from concrete pronouncements and 
disagreements. 
Despite recent setbacks at the polls, neoliberal ideology still holds sway over 
13much of the American political imagination,  offering a vision of democracy that is 
basically a political version of the marketplace. This neoliberal model is really a slight 
modification of the version of democracy enshrined as “pluralist democracy” in orthodox 
political science after WWII  and popularly venerated as simply “democracy.”  In that 
model, groups with conflicting interests competed for votes, providing a political system 
of checks and balances corresponding to the constitutional system designed to diffuse 
power and protect liberty.  As long as the system remained open (free access to organize 
groups, freedom to compete and publicize programs, free and fair elections), little 
participation was actually required of citizens, since elites could be counted on to 
countervail the interests of opposing elites, and thus the public interest would emerge 
almost as if directed by an invisible hand. Pluralism thus offered an economic model of 
democracy,  but one in which the units were groups, a conception very appropriate for 
the Fordist era when the dominant social forces were oligopolistic aglomerations such 
15as corporations and unions.  In the neoliberal mind, groups and organizations are 
dissolved into their component parts, individuals, who act politically in a manner parallel 
to market behavior, that is, rationally, with rationality equated with utility maximization.  
Thus citizens act as consumers, trying to maximize their utility politically as well as 
economically.  Politicians are political entrepreneurs, and parties are like companies, 
offering policies as political products and services, with taxes representing the price 
citizen-consumers must be willing to pay for them.  Citizens in fact spend their votes in 
the electoral marketplace as consumers “vote” their dollars in the literal market, 
purchasing the desired goods and services.  As long as there is free competition among 
the products offered (competing parties, freedom of association) and abundant 
information available to guide choices (freedom to campaign, free speech) and free 
choice as to how votes are spent (right to vote, secret ballot, civil liberties), the magic of 
the “invisible hand” should produce the public interest even if all the political participants, 
voters and politicians alike, seek their own personal interests without the first thought to 
14
The classic findings on American public opinion by Free and Cantril (1967) remain valid, as 
confirmed by recent surveys reported by Page and Jacobs (2009).  Americans tend to respond 
conservatively to questions posed abstractly (wanting lower taxes, fewer regulations, less government, 
etc.), but liberally when asked about specific government programs (a tax to support research on 
alternative energy, regulations to ensure food safety, government scholarships for students, etc.).  They 
are, in Free and Cantril's terms, ideological conservatives but programmatic liberals.  With this somewhat 
schizophrenic structure to public opinion, Democrats are able to win elections by offering concrete 
programs without challenging the ideological slogans on which Republicans campaign.
One classic statement of the model is a book of exactly that title by Anthony Downs (1957).
John Kenneth Galbraith (1971) famously formulated a theory of the countervailing powers of big 
corporations, big unions, and big government.  The classic theory was provided by Robert Dahl (1956) 
who called the model “polyarchy.”
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how choices affect the common good.  Market democracy, like a market economy, thus 
promises the best of both worlds: minimum burdens on altruism and rationality 
(considered as something more than utility maximization) in making social choices, yet 
in asking people only to think of themselves and their immediate and perhaps even 
irrational desires, the best interests of society are served without explicit efforts to 
ensure that the common good is protected. This market model of democracy, then, is a 
“thin” model indeed - not needing widespread participation to function nor requiring 
much of those who do in fact choose to participate (Barber, 1984).  
As appealing as this undemanding version of “citizenship lite" is, critics charge 
that it represents something close to false advertising as a system claiming to be 
democratic. If pluralist democracy tended in practice to be an “elite theory of democracy” 
(Bachrach 1967), its even thinner neoliberal cousin, that counts on the invisible hand of 
the  market to aggregate the individual choices of its unorganized citizen-consumers, is 
even more remote from the classic notion of democracy as rule of, by, and for the people 
(Lincoln, 1863). First, the role of citizens is highly limited; their role as choosers is 
passive, often based on little information, generally made with little practice or skill in 
choosing (Pateman 1970). Second, the scope of their choice is limited: citizens are 
presented with choices of someone else's making. Just as owners, not consumers, 
decide what options to offer in the marketplace, political elites, not citizens, shape the 
policy options available to the public. In the classical democracy, citizens were the owner 
of the polity, but in neoliberal democracy, the owners are the elites who decide what 
policy options to present to the passive public. Third, these political “products” are “sold” 
to the public, not on the basis of perfect information as economic theory posits but often 
on the basis of manipulated sales pitches. Elections resemble Madison Avenue 
campaigns, and the public dialogue is distorted by the same forces that create artificial 
demand for the glut of consumer products in modern capitalism.  As W. Lance Bennett 
(1992) points out, we have a 3M politics dominated by money, marketing, and media.  In 
this money saturated environment, not all choosers are equal. The democratic 
requirement of political equality is subverted by a system where elections, and 
increasingly the public sphere between elections in this era of the permanent campaign, 
is heavily influenced by wealth.  Contemporary campaigns in effect mix economic and 
political markets as dollars in the form of campaign contributions become as important 
as votes in determining the outcomes of elections.  Given the trends in astronomically 
escalating campaign costs and contribution in recent years, the narrowly legal technical 
effect of the 2009 Citizens United decision in removing the independent spending limits 
on corporations has probably had less impact that the symbolic message of the 
Supreme Court's reasoning that corporations are people and spending money is 
speech.  The estimated $6 billion dollars spent in the 2012 election reflects that wealthy 
donors as well as corporations have gotten the message that all stops have been 
removed and lavish spending to influence elections is now fair game.  Not only are 
unorganized citizens overwhelmed by the influx of money from corporations and their 
owners, but even organizations that purport to aggregated citizen clout are badly 
outgunned.  For example, corporations outspent unions by a ratio of 15:1 in the 2012 
election.  Fifth, as powerful as money is in influencing the choices citizens make, it is 
probably even more potent in determining the choices they do not make, by in effect 
vetoing some options and keeping some choices off the public agenda in the first place.  
The political use of wealth represents a powerful means for the “mobilization of  bias" 
that results in “non-decisions," that is, the maintenance of prevailing policies by ensuring 
that status quo is never challenged (Baratz and Bachrach 1970).  For example, just as 
corporate power has effectively blocked the introduction of alternatives to gasoline 
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nomination, but neither the President nor his party have offered clear proposals to 
16strengthen the nation's democratic institutions.  In fact, it seems unlikely that genuinely 
democratic reforms will come from the top down led by elites of either party with strong 
interests in the current dysfunctional political system.    
 Impetus to move the political system in a more democratic direction seems much 
more likely to stem from pressure coming from below. Commentators have noted that 
the Obama administration, absent agitation from activists, is unlikely to move beyond 
the hegemonic consensus currently stalemating Washington.  And this indeed seems to 
be the historic pattern. For instance, the strike wave of 1934 seems to have been 
instrumental in propelling President Franklin Roosevelt to move beyond the largely 
corporatist and restorative legislation initially passed by the New Deal (and struck down 
as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court), to propose much more sweeping and 
democratizing bills such as the Social Security Act and the National Labor Relations Act.  
It appears likely that only popular movements will be capable of compelling political 
elites to launch more democratic departures. The Occupy movements active in most 
major US cities in the fall of 2011 might have been a start, before it was suppressed by 
hostile police forces and political energies largely diverted into the 2012 election.  The 
smoldering remains of Occupy might still provide a spark to a wider, more sustainable 
popular movement, but for a vibrant, strong democracy, the United States needs its own 
version of an Arab Spring.
18
Although Democrats have resisted some of the more blatantly anti-democratic and highly partisan  
initiatives proposed and implemented by Republican officials aimed at limiting access to the ballot for 
constituencies likely to vote Democratic, protecting the vote is the bare minimum required for any model of 
democracy.  A still timid but slightly stronger democratic step would be making the right for workers to 
organize more realistically attainable, but the Democrats have not devoted real priority to pushing the 
Employee Free Choice Act that would arguably be a first if minor step toward assuring workers a voice in 
the workplace.
16         
8.        BIBLIOGRAPHY
Archer, Robin.  2010. Why Is There No Labor Party in the United States.  Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.
Bachrach, Peter.  1967. The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique. New York: Little Brown.
Baratz, Morton, and Peter Bachrach. 1970.  Power and Poverty. Oxford University Press.
Barber, Benjamin. 1984. Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Bennett, W. Lance.  1992: The Governing Crisis: Media, Money, and Marketing in American 
Elections.  New York: St. Martins.
Blow, Charles. “Dire Consequences and Denial.” New York Times (February 23, 2013).
Bowles, Samuel, and Herbert Gintis.  1982. The Crisis of Liberal Democratic Capitalism." 
Politics and Society 11/1 (March): 53-93.
Brown, Wendy. 2003.  “Neoliberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy.”  Theory and Event 
7/1. 
Buffet, Warren.  2006.  New York Times (November 26).
Burnham, Walter Dean. 1970. Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics.  
New York: W. W. Norton and Company. “CEOs Wrong to Promote Dangerous Budget Cuts, 350 
 Revista de Direitos Fundamentais e Democracia, Curitiba, v. 14, n. 14, p. 2-20, julho/dezembro de 2013.
THE CRISIS BEHIND THE CRISIS: IN SEARCH OF NEW MODEL OF DEMOCRACY
19
Economists Say." Huffington Post (November 14, 2012)
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
Cochran, Augustus Bonner, III.  2001.  Democracy Heading South: National Politics in the 
Shadow of Dixie.  Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
Dahl, Robert.  1956.  A Preface to Democratic Theory.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
Downs, Anthony.  1957.  An Economic Theory of Democracy.  New York: Harper.
Edwards, Richard.  1979.  Contested Terrain.  Basic Books.
Free, Lloyd A., and Hadley Cantril.  1967.  The Political Beliefs of Americans.  New Brunswick: 
Rutgers University Press.
Galbraith, John Kenneth.  1971.  New Industrial State.  Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Gavaneta, John. 1982.  Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an 
Appalachian Valley.  Champlain-Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Gordon, David, Richard Edwards, and Michael Reich.  1982.  Segmented Workers, Divided 
Work.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gross, Bertram.  1980.  Friendly Fascism. New York: M. Evans.
Hacker, Jacob, and Paul Pierson. 2011. Winner Take All Politics.  New York: Simon and 
Schuster. 
_____ 2010.  “Winner Take All Politics."  Politics and Society 38: 152-204.
Harvey, David. 2005.  A Brief History of Neoliberalism. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hauptmann, Emily.  2001.  “Can Less Be More? Leftist Deliberative Democrats' Critique of 
Participatory Democracy." Polity 33/3 (Spring): 397-421.
Hilmer, Jeffrey D. 2010.  “The State of Participatory Democratic Theory.”  New Political 
Science 32/1 (March): 43-63.
Key, V. O., Jr. 1955.  “A Theory of Critical Elections.”  Journal of Politics 17/1 (February): 3-18.
______1959.  “Secular Realignment and the Party System.  Journal of Politics 21/2 (May): 198-
210.
Kotz, David.  2009.  “The Financial and Economic Crisis of 2008: A Systematic Crisis of 
Neoliberal Capitalism."  Review of Radical Political Economics 41: 305-317.
_____ 1990.  “A Comparative analysis of the Theory of Regulation and the Social Structure of 
Accumulation Theory." Science & Society 54/1 (Spring): 5-28.
Krugman, Paul. “How to End This Recession." New York Review of Books (May 24, 2012). 
Lebowitz, Fran.  www.brainyquotes.com/quotes/quotes/f/franlebowi/102607.html 
(accessed  February 25, 2013).
Lincoln, Abraham. 1863. Gettysburg Address.
Mann, Thomas E., and Norman J. Ornstein.  2012.  It's Even Worse Than It Looks: How the 
American Constitutional System Collided with the New Politics of Extremism. NewYork: Basic 
Books.
McChesney, Robert W.  2004.  The Problem of the Media; U.S. Communication Politics in the 
Twenty-first Century.  New York: Monthly Review Press. 
McDonough, Terrence.  2008.  “Social Structures of Accumulation Theory: The State of the Art." 
Review of Radical Political Economy 40: 153-173.
 Revista de Direitos Fundamentais e Democracia, Curitiba, v. 14, n. 14, p. 2-20, julho/dezembro de 2013.
AUGUSTUS B. COCHRAN, III
McDonough, Terrence, Michael Reich, and David M. Kotz, eds. 2010.  Contemporary Capitalism 
and Its Crises.  New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mayhew, David. 2002. Electoral Realignments.  New Haven: Yale University Press.
Mills, C. Wright.  1956.  The Power Elite.  New York: Oxford University Press. 
Neilson, David.  2012. “Remaking the Connections: Marxism and the French Regulation 
School.”  Review of Radical Political Economics 44: 160-177.
Noah, Timothy.  2012.  The Great Divergence.  New York: Bloomsbury.
O'Connor, James.  1982.  The Fiscal Crisis of the State.  New York: St. Martins.
O'Hara, Phillip.  2003.  “Deep Recession and Financial Instability or a New Long Wave of 
Economic Growth for US Capitalism?  A Regulation School Approach.”  Review of Radical 
Political Economics 35: 18-43.
Page, Benjamin I., and Lawrence R. Jacobs.  2009.  Class War?  What Americans Really Think 
about Economic Inequality.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Pateman, Carole. 1970.  Participation and Democratic Theory.  Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
______2012.  “Participatory Democracy Revisited: APSA Presidential Address."  Perspectives 
on Politics 10/1 (March): 7-19.
Quiggin, John.  2010.  Zombie Economics: How Dead Ideas Still Walk Among Us. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.
Reich, Robert.  2007.  Supercapitalism: The Transformation of Business, Democracy, and 
Everyday Life.  New York: Knopf.  
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1987.  The Social Contract (in Basic Political Writings, ed. 
Donald A. Cress). New York: Hackett Publishing.
Ruccio, David.  1989.  “Fordism on a World Scale: International Dimensions of Regulation." 
Review of Radical Political Economics 21: 33-53.
Schlosser, Eric. 2001.  Fast Food Nation: The Dark Side of the All-American Meal.  Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin.
Skocpol, Theda.  1980.  “Capitalist Response to Crisis: Neomarxist Theories of the State and 
the Case of the New Deal."  Politics and Society 10/2 (March): 155-201.
Stiglitz, Joseph. 2012.  “The 1 Percent's Problem." Vanity Fair (June 2).
Telles, Steven M.  2008.  The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement: The Battle for Control 
of the Law.  Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Tickell, Adam, and Jamie A. Peck.  1992.  “Accumulation, Regulation, and the Geographies of   
Post Fordism: Missing Links in the Regulationist Research.”  Progress in Human Geography 
16:2: 190-2128.
Vitale, Denise.  2006.  “Between Deliberative and participatory Democracy: A Contribution on  
Habermas."  Philosophy and Social Criticism 32/6: 739-766. 
Winograd, Morley, and Michael D. Hais.  2008.  Millennium Makeover: MySpace, Y o u T u b e ,  
and the Future of American Politics.  New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
Whyte, William.  1959  Organization Man. New York: Richard D. Irvin, Inc.
Winters, Jeffrey A. 2011. Oligarchy.  New York: Cambridge University Press.
Wolin, Sheldon.  2008.  Democracy, Inc.  Princeton: Princeton University Press.




 Revista de Direitos Fundamentais e Democracia, Curitiba, v. 14, n. 14, p. 2-20, julho/dezembro de 2013.
THE CRISIS BEHIND THE CRISIS: IN SEARCH OF NEW MODEL OF DEMOCRACY
